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European youths, particularly in Southern countries, have incessantly extended their 
demand for education since the industrial crisis in the seventies. Labour market opportunities 
for youths have not registered any significant amelioration, though. Their outcomes are still 
quite vulnerable and dependent on the business cycle; Moreover, during the economic 
downturn in the mid nineties youth unemployment rates went to some  of their maximums 
ever reached. As a response, given the decrease in the opportunity cost of education and the 
public provision for all levels of education, youth have massively gone through longer and 
longer education processes. With the economic upswing  at the end of the nineties hardly any 
change in the patterns of demand for education was observed, and the effects of the recent 
downturn are yet to be evaluated.  
Most of the empirical evidence on the school-to-work transition process follows a 
sequential perspective: very often researchers look at young school-leavers labour transitions 
taking previous demand for education as given or exogenous. Such methodological approach 
needs the initial presumption that education and labour supply decisions are independent, 
although educational choices might depend on labour market prospects, which should as well 
influence labour supply. These arguments apply regardless the economic model we use to 
explain both educational decisions, as a result of a simple time constraint: youth will allocate 
their time on employment, study and leisure and decisions regarding each of them necessarily 
determine the rest. 
Needless to say, this hypothesis of independence is far from being realistic: youths 
may leave education because they bump into an interesting job offer or because the economic 
situation of the family requires the youth’s financial support. Despite this well-known feature 
of the school-to-work transition process, since most data sets do not make simultaneous 
analysis possible, the sequential perspective is the prevalent one. The European Community 
Household Panel (hereinafter, ECHP) gives us the opportunity to revisit the above-explained 
question and to contribute to the already very wide empirical evidence on determinants of 
youth demand for education and school-to-work transition. Its longitudinal nature makes it 
possible to look exactly at the moment when the education and labour market decisions of 
interest are being taken and, given the way information on education a ctivities is provided, it   2
enables the observation and estimation of both transitions under a simultaneous framework. 
Moreover, its international and comparative design will also enrich prior results on the topic, 
since it will allow us to observe differences across countries in the European Union. 
As for the empirical strategy, we apply a  bivariate  model for the simultaneous 
decisions of start working and stop studying among non employed students in the European 
Union using a sample of nonworking young (under 30 in 1994) students in 13 different 
countries in the EU (EU15 except Luxembourg and Sweden) drawn from the ECHP. 
Particular concern has been made on controlling for regional, family, business cycle (or 
demand side) and institutional factors affecting these decisions. 
Results point that expected labour market outcomes measured through wage premiums 
and unemployment rates do not contribute to explain the interruption in the demand for 
education, other factors  – household income, financial help, regional w ealth  - being more 
important. Nevertheless, a very significant relation has been found between both types of 
decisions, youth being much more prone to leave education if they are to accept a job offer. 
The paper goes as follows: next section goes briefly t hrough some former empirical 
evidence on youths education and employment transitions. After that, both the theoretical 
model (Section 3) and the empirical strategy (Section 4) are presented, and we briefly 
introduce our data-set and present some relevant descriptive analysis (Section 5) before going 
into the results of the econometric estimations (Sections 6). Finally, some concluding remarks 
and the research agenda are gathered in an ending section.  
 
2. FORMER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Demand for education and  school-to-work transitions have received much attention 
from both Economics of Education and Labour Economics empirical literature. To name but a 
few of the recent ones, Albert  et al.  (2002) study demand for education patterns of Irish, 
German and Spanish  youth, and find a relevant influence of family background characteristics 
on the kind and amount of human capital youths invest on. As for the effect of wage 
expectations on educational decisions, we could mention Oosterbeck and Van Ophem (2000) 
who take i nto account the two-tier nature of education as consumption good and asset. Several 
empirical pieces of work have added more relevant variables such as (un)employment 
expectations (Kodde, 1986), family background (Wulff (1999), Ermisch and Francesconi   3
(2001), Casquel (2003)), gender (Ianelli, 2002 and Smyth, 2002) among many others. Ianelli 
(2002) and Smyth (2002) use an international data-set, the ad-hoc module of the EULFS, and 
refer to the nineties as well, but the information gathered there is strictly  retrospective and 
they are not able to look at the moment when education was interrupted and access to initial 
working life started. This marks an outstanding difference with the present paper.  
As for the first decisions in the labour market, youths may c hoose from a whole 
arrange of possibilities. Although, for the sake of simplicity, we will only divide youths 
between those who start working and those who do not, job search options are also very often 
included in theoretical models. Albert  et al. (1998), Soro (2001), Denny and Harmon (2000) 
and Nguyen and Taylor (2003), to name a few, consider the possibility of going to 
employment, unemployment or just keep inactive and in education. All of them adopt a 
mutually exclusive alternatives framework, which may be solved with a multinomial  logit 
model, whereas the assumption of independence of the different decisions has been released 
here through the use of a bivariate estimation and the resolution of a two equations system. 
The adoption of  simultaneous approaches  for the study of labour supply and 
educational decisions is far from being new (Blinder-Weiss, 1976; Heckman, 1976). With the 
availability of longitudinal data-sets  technically sophisticated proposals have been developed, 
such as Keane and Wolpin (1997), who provide for a simulation of the career of a sample of 
young men provided they maximise utility coming from four different states along life course: 
studying, looking for a job, working or leisure. But very often researchers find themselves 
constrained by cross-section databases where they are not able to observe decisions in “real 
time”. That is the case of Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) and Gianelli and 
Monfardini (2003). The former develop a simultaneous model for the joint decisions of 
working, studying and leaving the parental household by young people in Spain. Endogeneity 
of the three decisions (which is entered in the empirical model through an adaptation of the 
Generalised Method of Moments methodology usually applied to panel data) proves to be 
important in order to understand the dynamics of household formation. The latter  study the 
decisions of Italian young adults both related to education versus work and the option to 
remain at parental home. They study the effect of labour market conditions (affecting income 
and employment expectations) and family background characteristics together with housing 
costs. Their empirical strategy is a multinomial  probit model, which allows to release of the 
hypothesis of independence of irrelevant alternatives that applies in multinomial  logits.  The 
alternatives are exclusive (i.e. studies and work may not be simultaneous). The decision to   4
make study and employment compatible options has been addressed by Cebrián et al. (2000) 
for the Spanish case  using the European Community Household Panel and a very similar 
technique to the one used here (although they add the control for a possible selection bias in 
any of the two decisions involved in the to the biprobit model). They find that, in Spain, those 
who study and work tend to be full-time workers who take study as a marginal option.  
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Human capital theory is the most widespread theoretical tool for the study of 
individual education decisions and takes into account personal a nd labour market conditions. 
Nevertheless, i nitial steps in the labour market require a combination of education and labour 
supply decisions and may only be approached through a combination of human capital and 
labour supply theories
2 (Bradley, 1990 and Bradley  et al, 1991): On the one hand, the 
decision of leaving education over the compulsory levels is very much linked to the labour 
supply decisions; the latter depend on non wage income, time preferences, leisure preferences 
and budget constraints, which  are given by both expected wages and employment 
opportunities in the market. On the other hand, according to human capital theory (Becker, 
1964), in order to maximise the future flow of labour income individuals will choose the 
amount and kind of human capital that maximise the gap between expected returns
3 and costs, 
that is, net benefits. For computing net benefits the youth needs to estimate (monetary) 
rewards net of expected direct and indirect (opportunity) costs.  
In the following paragraphs we will t ry to combine both transitions of interest in a 
single utility maximising exercise, in line with  Keane and Wolpin (1997) and, especially, 
Gianelli and Morfardini (2003): 
Young people assume their lifetime expected utility,  Ut, derived from the consumption 
of goods and leisure,  Ct  and Lt, subject to a number of constraints. Say their individual utility 
function follows the traditional expression:  
                                                 
2 Being both framed in the neoclassical tradition and using a utility maximization approach, it is quite 
straightforward to combine them in order to achieve a description of education and labour supply decisions 
where endogeneity of both dependent variables is considered.  
3 Wages are just part of the returns to education, given that there are many non-monetary returns to education 
(in terms of health, satisfaction, job quality, status, happiness and the like) but, for simplicity, we will constrain 
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where d is the rate of time preferences and tend denotes working life expected duration. Note 
that (1) is true if utilities are inter-temporally separable. The maximization problem needs to 
be solved under four kinds of constraints: First of all, a budget constrain, given by the whole 
amount of income the youth expects along her working life  net of direct and indirect costs 
linked to the decisions taken: 
￿
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where  Wt  means wages expected in the labour market, Yf refers to family income
4; Ynw refers 
to non wage income derived from government social schemes, which cover from  grants and 
subsidies for students to unemployment assistance, DCt are the direct costs of education, fixed 
and independent from the time devoted to study in every time unit (t). Finally, OCt refers to 
opportunity costs lined to the abovementioned alternatives, which may be expressed as 
follows: 
OCt = StWt                                                       (3) 
where  St  is the portion of every time unit devoted to study, which is a decision variable: 
youths decide how much time to allocate to study in every time unit (regardless the unit: 
months, weeks, even days).  
As for the second constraint, earnings are defined by:  
) 4 ( H K w W t t t t =  
where  wt  is the wage rate prevailing at time  t,  depending on the future aggregate supply and 
demand for labour with an accumulation of human capital.  Kt  refers to the type (vocational, 
general programmes, on-the-job training) and amount (say, level) of human capital investment 
the individual has achieved at t (see the accumulation rule at (6)). Note that Ht, the portion of 
every time unit devoted to work, is also a decision variable: it will depend both on demand 
and supply factors. From the supply viewpoint, the amount of hours offered in the labour 
market depends on non-labour income and also on hourly wage rate, together with 
preferences for leisure. From the demand side, it depends on the economic cycle and, 
                                                 
4  This will be entered in the empirical m odel through two different variables, since parents may support 
youths both through cohabitation and direct monetary transfers   6
particularly, on those features in the labour market that may have a stronger impact on new 
job creation, such as labour market regulation and active labour market policies  (hereinafter, 
ALMPs).  
We need to add a time constrain as well, since time may be devoted to study, leisure
5 
or work:  
T = Ht + St + Lt                                            (5) 
Finally, we may introduce a human capital accumulation rule, given that human 
capital may be acquired both from education or from working experience. In our model, 
youths may even devote their time to both activities at the same time, which means that, if we 
observed one young student in moment “ t” we may observe t he following array of human 
capital accumulation possibilities:  
Kt = Kt-1 + lFv(St)+(1-l) Fg(St)    if t = 1,…, t*  
Kt = Kt-1 + lFv(St)+(1-l) Fg(St) + G(Ht)  if t = t*, …, t**    (6) 
Kt = Kt-1 + G(Ht)        if t = t**, ..., tend 
where  l  ˛ (0,1)  represents the degree of proximity of education programs to occupation-
specific training requirements. If  l = 0 , education programmes cover only general knowledge 
non directly applicable to the labour market, whereas if  l = 1 training is completely liked to 
the tasks needed in an occupation, i.e. on-the-job vocational training. Youths are not supposed 
to be able to switch every year from vocational to general programmes. As for Fv, Fg and G, 
they  are functions, meaning the amount of human capital that may be obtained by the  youth 
from the allocation of time between  St and Ht. Fv(g) would express productivity of each unit of 
time devoted to study ( St) on vocational (general) programmes, whereas G refers to ability to 
transform time in work (Ht) into specific human capital.  
The distribution of time set in (6) means that, during a certain period (t-t
*), youth will 
only be interested on accumulating human capital as formal education, whereas they might 
share both ways of investment during some time ( t
*-t
**) or, directly, go to the labour market 
until the end of working life ( t
**, tend). Therefore, for youth who make both transitions at the 
same time (stop studying and starts working) t
* = t
**. In our data-set all the individuals in the 
sample are initially in  t, and we will here a ssume that youths may always study “something 
                                                 
5 Lt is directly introduced in the utility function as a “good” as well a Ct, consumption at t. Since T is given, 
and St  and Ht  are decision variables,  Lt might be seen as a “residual”, just time devoted to non-productive 
activities; Nevertheless, since it is economic meaningful, it may also be seen as a decision variable, being an 
input for the utility function.    7
else” in the education system: young graduates may always enrol in a Master course or a Ph 
programme, those in secondary education have access to higher education, and the like. This 
is somewhat simplistic, particularly for youths living in small towns or in rural areas. 
The youth is assumed to choose the amount and kind of human capital and the 
working experience that maximizes her utility. As long as she must think simultaneously 
about whether to start working (from the future earnings and employment expectations) or go 
on studying (from the combination of expected wages and costs derived from education), 
youth find themselves in the need to maximize a combination of several partial or indirect 
utilities, which are given by  u s, now; u s,w; u nos, w ; u nos, now. Given that our target group will be 
initially nonworking students ( s,now), the rest of the alternatives represent the utilities of start 
working while going on studying ( s,w), interrupt studies and start working (nos,w) or interrupt 
studies but non start working (nos,now) against continuing as non working students (s,now).  
Therefore, the final utility function the individual needs to maximize should be given 
by the following problem:  
Max L = max (u s,w; u s, now; u nos, w; u nos, now)   (7) 
Each indirect utility function depends to a different set of variables which were 
commented in the paragraphs above and will be listed:  
L = f(income expectations, non-wage income, labour market conditions, personal 
characteristics, institutional framework
6) 
And, given the abovementioned time constraint (5) and the expression (2) for overall 
utility, all these partial decisions are interdependent, that is, the decisions of working and 
studying are taken simultaneously and the c ombination of them derive in the four possibilities 
given in (7). The way the utility maximizing problem is tackled calls for a specific empirical 
strategy, which will presented in the next section.  
The hypotheses we would like to test in the case of the decision to stop education, will 
be the following ones:   
•  If (un)employment or wage rates ( wt) are not the same for all youths, those variables 
different from human capital accumulation that derive in different wage rates or 
                                                 
6 The theoretical model does not explicitly consider institutional differences, which are taken as given. In our 
case, though, they acquire a crucial role in explaining international differences given that they may condition 
most of the variables in the model: from direct c ost of education to average wage rate and unemployment 
expectations, among others.   8
employment opportunities will c ondition both returns and opportunity costs of 
education. One example of such variables is gender: women  tend to demand more 
education despite their lower returns  (European Commission, 2002) because of their 
also smaller opportunity costs compared to their male counterparts.  
•  Labour market conditions may also change employment ( Ht) and wage (wt) prospects 
for youth and, therefore, expected returns and opportunity costs of investment on 
education. For instance, a higher unemployment rate is expected to keep youth in the 
education system because it decreases the opportunity cost of studying, whereas the 
wage premium for education will have the same effect, meaning a higher net return to 
education. The same applies to the composition of the demand for skills and the extent 
till which youth access to jobs requiring high qualifications. 
•  Those with an initially higher level of education (Kt-1) and those in longer programmes 
will be the ones less prone to leave education: once youths have achieved a certain 
level it is less costly in time and direct resources to go on in education. 
•  Those living with educated people (i.e. parents) will tend to lengthen their time in 
education. The same applies for those in a country with high enrolment rates, where 
we could find a sort of “peer effect”
7, or in a country where public expenditure on 
education is large or has been recently increased, which could act as indicators of 
growing availability of training places. 
•  Any kind of non-wage income (such as family income, private transfers, 
unemployment subsidies or grants) should contribute to keep students at school, since 
both variables reduce the cost of education and increase, therefore, net rewards for 
education. The same applies to the wealth in the area where youth lives, since i t is 
                                                 
7 This may have a two-tier interpretation: on the one hand, youths will study more if their relatives and friends 
do, being education a “cheap” option in terms of psychological costs for being “different” to the average. On the 
other hand, the more the previous cohorts study, the higher the necessary investment to be done if restrictions in 
the availability of jobs are accepted. Under a strict human capital frame, though, the higher the level of education 
in one’s cohort or those immediately prior, the lower the expected wage as a result of future competition in the 
labour market (a larger supply of skilled workers will push down wages if the demand for skilled workers does 
not increase at the same pace). Should returns to education diminish, the interest for going on education would 
diminish as well. The question lies on a very basic assumption: if we accept wages being flexible and reacting to 
relative supply and demand for skills we could expect higher education attainment in people around to push 
youths out of the education system, given that it is no longer profitable at shirt or mid-term. On the contrary, 
should we accept that wages are not so flexible and certain restraints to the demand for labour prevail, we would 
assume a job-competition approach and (Thurow, 1975) and would expect higher education in people around to 
keeps youths in education until they reach, at least, the same level as the average. The long-term trend is a 
continuously increasing level of education attainment in the population.    9
correlated with employment rates and financial resources from families or the public 
sector to provide youths with education. 
As for the probability to start working, we would like to test the following:  
•  Human capital investment either provides a good signal for employers or increases 
productivity of workers. Whatever the argument, the result should be that a higher 
level of education will enhance access to a job. But given a level of education, those 
fields of study more linked to the labour market n eeds (those with  l nearer to 1) 
should provide for a quicker exit to employment.  
•  Those who live with their parents and those who get any kind of non-wage income 
will need less time at work ( Ht) to maximise their utility functions. For them, study 
and leisure are cheaper options and, given the time constraint, they will register a 
higher St (or Lt) and lower Ht, which will result in a later entry into the labour market. 
•  Those who live in a country with institutional mechanisms that enhance the school-to-
work transitions (i.e. employment protection, ALMPs, availability to employ under 
temporary basis, access to high status occupations) will have, everything else the 
same, a higher probability of being employed in the near future.  
 
4. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY: BIVARIATE PROBITS 
 
The econometric strategy applied here is a  bivariate probit
8  on the two decisions 
considered in the theoretical model: stop education or start working. Following Greene 
(2000), the bivariate model applies when two decisions may be interdependent or may depend 
on a common set of explanatory variables. In our case, youth decide simultaneously whether 
to stop studying or to start working and there are factors that influence both decisions. We 
                                                 
8 Given that we study transitions from education out of the education system and into the labour market, the 
direct question is “why not using a duration model for tackling this?” Two main econometric problems arise: 
The first one is that we are estimating two durations until two different events do take place. This could be 
tackled through competing risks models where the independence and exclusivity of ends would apply. The 
interdependence of durations and hazard functions would complicate extraordinarily the search for a likelihood 
function to maximise. The second problem is also quite difficult to assess: the ECHP does not provide with the 
exact date when the current studies started when this happened two years or more before the interview, which is, 
moreover, the most common case. We have therefore not only a left censoring problem, but also a possible self 
selection problem: since the survey is performed randomly to individuals in a certain moment of their lives, 
those who study more time are more prone to be found in education, and those who study more are, as well, 
more prone to remain in the education system, which would contribute to biased estimators for transitions 
patterns.   10
assume that youths undertake the decision that maximise their utility function but we are not 
able to observe directly the partial utilities expressed in (7). Instead, we observe the 
transitions themselves, so that although  uSE (the probability of stopping education) and  uSW 
(the probability of starting work) are not observable, the decisions deriving their value being 
over 0 are observed:  
u*SE = XSEbSE + uSE,  u*SW = XSWbSW + uSW 
 
u SE = 1  if  u*SE > 0  u SW = 1  if  u*SW > 0  (8) 
u SE = 0  otherwise  u SW = 0  otherwise   
(u*SE > 0 if u s,w <u nos,w  and  
u*SE > 0 if u s, now<u nos, now) 
(u*SW > 0 if u s,now < u s,w and 
u*SW > 0 if u nos, now< u nos, w) 
 
This two-equation model is featured by correlated disturbances each of which follow a 
normal distribution. That is:  
E [uSE] = E [uSW] = 0 
Var [uSE] = Var [uSW] = 1 
Cov [uSE ,uSW] = r 
where r is a “correlation parameter” denoting the extent to which the two error terms covary. 
Should this be the case, we would need to estimate the two equations jointly, following a 
bivariate normal distribution:  {uSE, u SW} ~ f2(0,0,1,1, r). As long as we are interested in both 
decisions simultaneously, we need to define the joint probability, which is as follows:  
￿ ￿
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As in the standard  probit  model, observations contribute some combination of 
Pr(u k=1) for k  ˛ {SE,SW}, depending on their specific values on those variables. The (log)-
likelihood is then just a sum across the four possible transition probabilities (that is, the four 
possible combinations of  uSE  and  uSW) times their associated probabilities (Greene, 2000). 
These probabilities may be drawn from (9) as well.  The most relevant coefficients estimated 
in the model are  â ˆ SE  , â ˆ SW and r. The latter, if significantly different from 0, will evaluate to 
which extent both decisions are inter-related.   
Another interesting information is the one generated in marginal effects (Greene, 
2000): we may infer the effect of a covariate on each dependent variable regardless this 
covariate is initially in the same equation or not, given that both dependent variables are 
connected through error terms. To complete the amount of information derived from the   11
results of the models, we may finally obtain conditional probabilities, that is, E[u SE|u SW  = 1, x] 
and E[u SE|u SW = 1, x], also explained in detail in Greene (2000). 
Last but not least, given that there are many individuals who are observed several 
times during the observation period robust variance estimates have been produced across 
individual observations (using a cluster adjustment as developed by Huber, 1967).  
Explanatory variables for the equation of education disruption include those 
conditioning costs of education, those which influence returns to education and some personal 
characteristics that may have bearing on both at the same time. The vector  Xs of personal 
explanatory variables in the first equation is, therefore, conformed by gender, age, level and 
type of education; family related variables are education attainment of the head of the 
household and household equivalent income relative to the average GDP per capita expressed 
PPP in regions (aggregated at NUTS2 level) of residence. As for the earnings expectations 
influencing human capital decisions, we have computed the wage youths could achieve if they 
completed the immediately higher education level
9 and the probability of failure in the labour 
market (unemployment rate by gender, age and country) if she decided to leave education in 
the moment of the interview. Non-wage income is approached through grants and fellowships 
received during the year prior to the survey. The nation-wide institutional and economic 
factors affecting demand for education are the recent increase on public expenditure on 
education, the yearly expected income from the welfare state (adding household a llowances 
and unemployment benefits) if youth went into non-experienced unemployment
10 and the 
enrolment rate for her age and gender. Finally, the GDP at NUTS 2 level (ESA95) expressed 
in purchase power parities per inhabitant (in logs), is also used as a proxy for average income 
in the region of residence. 
Among explanatory variables for the second equation ( Xw) we have gathered personal 
features, but also a set of institutional characteristics and national-wide indicators of the 
labour markets. Personal features are, again, gender and age, together with the level and kind 
of education (vocational specificity of the programme the student is attending), whether the 
youth lives independently from their parents, non-wage income, whether the youth received 
                                                 
9 For those who are studying higher education we have computed the wage gap between those young 
university graduates who are working in occupations that only require short cycle university degrees (technicians 
and associate professionals) and those  who require long cycle university degrees, such as professionals, 
legislators, managers, and the like.  
10 It has been computed from the information available in OECD “Benefits and wages, 2003”. Computations 
include housing allowances and unemployment special subsidies for non-experienced unemployed youths. They 
are not included here for the sake of brevity but are available from the author upon request.    12
any p rivate transfer the year prior to the interview
11, and former worker experience. As for 
national labour market or institutional variables, we have included four indicators: 
expenditure on active labour market programmes targeted at unemployed youth as a 
percentage of GDP, strictness in employment protection legislation (according to the OECD 
definition for regular employment) and temporality rates among youth as a proxy for both the 
relative ease to hire youths under temporary basis and the elasticity of youth employment to 
changes in the economic cycle. Finally, we will control for the relative openness of the labour 
market to new entrants. This can be measured through different indicators, among which we 
have chosen the proportion of youths who work in “professional occupations”: wherever 
youths access to high scale jobs, this means that both the labour market is creating qualified 
jobs and the ILM structures do not refrain youths on the doorstep of the labour market. 
Finally, controls for country of residence (through a set of dummy variables) and for 
the year of the interview have been introduced in both equations. The aim is to find those 
differences that, once all the rest of national, cyclical, regional and individual characteristics 
are controlled for,  still remain across individuals or along the time. For example, dummies for 
countries may indicate (among other things) different educational systems.  There are two 
main types of educational systems in Europe: sequential systems and dual systems. The 
former (and also the most common, as it prevails in northern countries such as Finland and 
Sweden, and also in southern countries such as France, Italy and Spain) separates initial 
training completely from work experience: youth enter the labour market once they have 
finished formal education. The dual system is pursued by Germany and other German-
speaking countries, such as Austria, together with Denmark. It provides with specific training 
in firms as part of the general education of youths and training in particular occupations 
instead of general skills and knowledge is the rule. Dual systems are well-known for 
enhancing success at labour market outcomes for school-leavers much more than sequential 
ones (OECD, 1998). 
The last relevant coefficient in the models  refers to the correlation between the error 
terms in both equations, which could mean either that both decisions are strongly interrelated 
and, therefore, must be studied under a simultaneous framework, or that there are factors 
affecting both decisions that are either unobserved for the researcher or omitted in the 
specification. In our case, both possibilities are plausible: first, because of time constraints, so 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, as the reader may have already noticed, all income variables in the ECHP refer to the year 
prior to the interview except those concerning current monthly wage, which are used here only for the 
computation of wage premiums.   13
that the more time is devoted to education, the less is available for the labour market; second, 
because of important unobserved variables such as ability
12 and present consumption 
preferences, for which there is no information available in the ECHP. Ability does not only 
contribute to enhance investment on education but also improves employment chances. As for 
time preferences, those who invest more in education show a higher preference for the future 
and the opposite holds for those early school leavers or early labour market entrants. This 
coefficient is expected to be significant and positive, m eaning that both transitions of interest 
are usually taken at the same time and condition each other.  
As for the expected sign in the coefficients for the different explanatory variables, 
some hypotheses have already been drawn from the theoretical model: any feature or 
circumstance that increases (reduces) the opportunity cost of studying will reduce (increase) 
the probability of stopping education. Good labour market prospects should enhance 
transitions towards employment and out of the education system. Variables related to non-
wage income contribute to refrain youths from taking any of the decisions of interest.  
 
5. THE ECHP AND SOME INITIAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
We have tackled this study with The European Community Household Panel
13 
because of several reasons, the most relevant of which could be its longitudinal and 
comparative nature. Besides, being a household survey, it is possible to control for family 
characteristics and it covers all kinds of school attendants, from all levels and kinds of 
programmes, which diversity may be, at least partially, controlled for. Some minor problems 
have arisen, such as the small sample size for the particular target group (nonworking young 
students), together with the usual attrition in household panels which may cause an 
underestimation of all kinds of transitions, particularly the ones into employment in case they 
coincide with geographical mobility or the formation of a new household.  
Data cover from 1995 to 2000 due to the lack of detailed information in 1994 in the 
ECHP about the types of programmes young students attended. Data from Sweden and 
                                                 
12 In Davia (2003) an ex-post measure of ability was introduced in a single equation framework on the 
decision to stop education. It referred to the relative delay in the achievement of the former education level. It 
turned out to be not significant in any of the specifications or groups. Should we have had a measure of academic 
outcomes, i.e. marks achieved at the last exams, we could have constructed a somehow reliable measure of 
ability. 
13 Eurostat, European Community Household Survey Users’ Database (ECHP-UDB), version of July 2003.   14
Luxembourg have been finally excluded in the multivariate analysis due to both sample size 
problems and difficulties to follow individuals along time.  
Particular attention has been devoted to complete the information in the data-set with 
labour market and institutional indicators at regional (using REGIO data-set, which is also a 
product of Eurostat) and national level, together with the estimation of wage premiums to 
denote expected rewards to education.  
As for the most relevant initial descriptive information, Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of the whole initial sample (youths under 30 in 1994) in all the countries in the ECHP at the 
first interview where complete information on education is available (1995) or in the first 
interview when the youth enters the survey. It may be noticed that the sub-sample of interest, 
non-working young students were a small part of the overall sample of youth in several 
countries, particularly in Luxembourg, the UK and Germany. It was a very important part of 
the youth population in Spain, France, Belgium, Finland, Sweden and, at a lower extent, in 
Ireland and Denmark. The combination of education and work was quite common in 
Denmark, the  UK, Finland and Sweden, and youths in Italy, Greece and Spain were more 
prone to be out of the education system and the labour market at the same time than in the rest 
of the countries. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
We have also looked at the main transitions (Figure 2) from non-employed students 
and we have noticed that in some countries transitions to employment are more intensive than 
transitions out of education, which means that there is a certain amount of youths who start 
working before finishing education ( Denmark and the Netherlands are good examples, 
followed by Germany and Austria). In most cases, though, youths undertake both transitions 
at the same time or very close to each other. On the contrary, in Italy and Greece (followed by 
Spain, France and Finland) there is a higher proportion of non-employed students who leave 
education compared to the ones who go to employment, which indicates the relevance of 
transitions out of education but to non-employment (either unemployment or inactivity) in 
those countries.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
Finally, Table 1  shows the main descriptors of the explanatory variables for both 
equations. It has been split into levels of education and types of programmes, according to the 
subsequent multivariate analysis. Taking the pool of observations from the second to the sixth   15
interview, we observe that, for every two subsequent years, observations linked to higher 
levels of education attainment and general training register lower transition rates to both 
employment and out of education. Nearly one forth of the whole sample are students in short 
university programmes and almost one third are in upper general secondary programmes, the 
rest being unevenly distributed across the rest of educational levels and types of programmes. 
Students in higher levels of education and in general programmes belong, in average, to 
wealthier families, estimated wage premiums are higher for those attending lower levels of 
education and those in general programmes. Those in secondary general education register the 
highest risks of going into unemployment. The heads of the households where youths in 
higher education live (usually parents but also partners in the case of those who live 
independently form their parental families) with more educated than the average.  
(Table 1 about here) 
As for the distribution of the sample across countries, Italian and Spanish sub-samples 
are the most represented ones, each one gathering 20% of the total amount of observations, 
being followed by France (13%). The rest of the  country sub-samples not only have smaller 
initial sample sizes but also register lower incidence of non-employed students.   
 
6. THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE ESTIMATIONS 
 
This section aims at summarising the main results of the bivariate probits estimated on 
the transitions out of education and into employment. First, we will report here results for the 
whole sample and, afterwards, the model has been replicated for those who were enrolled in 
general programmes against those in vocational training. The l atter are linked to a higher 
short-term access to employment, even before education finishes. Besides, preferences 
towards more or less specific training may also condition behaviour and decisions of both 
students and job seekers.  
We have also split the sample according to the level of education attended in order to 
check whether the behaviour of youths changes across levels and kinds of education, provided 
a different composition of sub-samples. This seems to be quite plausible, since the higher the 
investment, the higher the possible loss in case it gets interrupted and the profile of those who 
achieve higher education is necessarily different from those in lower levels, not only because   16
of age, but also because their income and employment expectations are different, they might 
come from slightly different family backgrounds, and the some other arguments.  
The “overall” specification (Table 2) shows the coefficients for the whole sample. 
Results may be summarised as follows: as regards the probability of l eaving education, 
women tend to persist more in education than men (confirming, therefore, our expectations), 
elder students are more prone to leave education when the level attained is controlled for; the 
higher the level the lower the probability to stop education. Besides, general programmes tend 
to maintain students more time in education than vocational training tracks do. Family income 
and the education attainment of the head of the household, as well as fellowships and 
enrolment rate, are related to longer stays in education.  
Unlike much of the previous evidence on the topic, the labour market indicators do not 
seem to confirm the basic human capital theory hypothesis: expected wage premium if 
achieving a higher level of education is not significant  and unemployment rate, when 
significant, shows the opposite sign to the expected although the estimated coefficients hardly 
differ from zero. Moreover, the expected income from government subsidies if the youth went 
into the labour market and did not succeed in finding a job does not make any difference in 
this decision
14. Finally, youth living in wealthier regions tend to persist more in education. 
Regional per capita income is correlated with employment rates, purchase power of families 
and financial resources from families and public administrations to subsidise youths 
education. 
Concerning the probability of accessing a job, we find no gender differences in the 
whole sample once the rest of covariates are controlled for. Elder students tend to transit more 
into employment and the longer and higher level programmes apparently contribute less to 
achieve a job than very specific, low level vocational training schemes
15. Again, general 
programmes provide a lower exit rate towards employment. Labour market and c ycle 
indicators are particularly relevant here: youth in wealthier regions transit more to 
employment, employment rates, which may act as a cycle indicator, show the positive 
elasticity of youth employment to the evolution of the demand for labour in the n ational 
economy, and the same applies for temporality rates and active labour market policies 
                                                 
14 Nevertheless, there may be a strong composition effect given the heterogeneity of the sample that might 
blur the results. The coefficients for the different sub-samples show clearer profiles. 
15 Nevertheless, the latter are shorter than the former and we are studying youths who are initially undertaking 
education regardless how much time they need to finish the programme they are enrolled in. Should we restrict 
our sample to those who really finish their studies during the period of observation that is, to school-leavers 
strictly speaking, we should find less poor labour market outcomes for highly qualified youths.     17
addressed to youth, together with the proportion of youth employed as “professionals”, which 
intends to measure access of youths to highly qualified jobs. The opposite holds true for 
strictness in employment protection legislation.  
As for differences across countries, the estimated coefficients do not always provide 
for a clear idea of the size of country effects. At the end of this section predicted probabilities 
and marginal and conditional effects will be plotted and national differences will be properly 
settled or quantified.  
In the overall specification and for all the specified groups the correlation between 
errors coefficient ( rho) is very significant and positive, meaning that those who decide to stop 
education will be more prone to start working as well.  
As already mentioned, we have split the sample in those who have attended general 
and vocational programmes (Table 2). There is hardly any difference across those groups in 
the decision of going on education: only receiving grants contributes more to keep youths in 
vocational training than in general programmes. We could say that the direction of effects is 
the same in all the explanatory variables, and the only differences might appear in the size of 
the effects. As for the second equation in the model, active labour market policies and 
strictness in employment protection legislation seem to alter significantly employment 
chances for only those in general  programmes. It seems that, although economic cycle and 
personal features alter employment decisions of both vocational training and general 
programmes students, the former are less dependent on institutional frameworks and active 
measures, being, in general, more prone to enter the labour market than the latter. 
When we split the sample in three groups according to the aggregated level of 
education, we find interesting differences across youths who are involved in different 
education options. Only the most  relevant peculiarities for each group will be mentioned here, 
whereas those variables that follow the general trend seen in the paragraphs above will not be 
commented. Interestingly, women do not register a higher persistence in tertiary education, 
fellowships seem to retain youth in education when they initially attend second cycle at 
secondary (and not tertiary, as would be expected), wage premium if continuing studies is 
only relevant for tertiary education students, whereas unemployment rate is only significant in 
the equation for  the least qualified
16. Regional wealth is not related with the persistence in the 
                                                 
16 Unemployment rate for youth in the same age and education attainment achieved might measure not only 
employment expectations, but also the result of people in that level of education exiting to the labour market and 
not finding jobs, that is, it may be the result, and not the cause, of the exit from education and, therefore, the   18
lowest levels of education but household income is more relevant for this level compared to 
the rest.  
When looking at the transition into employment, living with parents and non-wage 
income affect employment choices to students in secondary education, whereas students in 
higher education show no reaction to these matters. Former working experience is relevant for 
all except for the least qualified and expenditure on ALMPs for youth, surprisingly, is only 
related to the probability of accessing employment from higher education. This is not 
consistent with the expected, since ALMPs are particularly addressed at long-term 
unemployed and the underprivileged youth, and should, therefore, affect their employment 
expectations more that the rest’s
17. On the other hand, strictness in employment protection 
legislation only affects negatively the chances of accessing a job for the least qualified. 
Interestingly enough, the relative presence of professionals in youth employment is positively 
correlated with the likelihood of accessing a job
18 in all the groups. As regards international 
differences, they will also be assessed when looking at marginal and conditional effects at the 
end of this section.  
As seen in Section 4, bivariate probits provide with two interesting additional ways of 
displaying relevant results: marginal effects and conditional probabilities. Marginal effects 
allow observing the effect on, say, variable X on Y both directly and through its effect on Z, 
being Y and Z the relevant decisions under study. We have obtained a battery of predicted 
values to gain a richer and more complete view of differences across groups that the estimated 
coefficients in the models do not always clearly reflect.  
We will first focus on relevant marginal and conditional probabilities for the two 
transitions of interest in the model
19: Figure 3 registers the predicted values for all the 
countries, with dark-coloured lines for marginal effects and light-coloured ones for 
conditional probabilities. Since both probabilities (as we saw in the coefficient for the 
                                                                                                                                                         
positive sign could apply in this coefficient. A different argument could be as follows: unemployment rates 
measure returns of education; if youths found that education is less profitable, the option to maximise income in 
the mid-term would be start working as soon as possible, even despite low chances of success. 
17 We think that this measure is correlated with national wealth and financial capacity to promote employment 
and, in those countries, jobs with high qualification requirements are created, the education attainment of youth 
is higher in average and qualified youth succeed more in the access to the labour market. 
18 This is a very interesting result: it may indicate that, when qualified youth do not have severe problems to 
access the labour market in the proper jobs and, therefore, find proper matches in the labour market, they do not 
interfere in the rest of the youth labour market and do not cause a crowding-out effect on their least qualified 
counterparts.   
19 Results for the Netherlands are quite inconsistent with both the descriptive analysis and the expected what 
we know about the institutional framework. We think that the re-arrangements in the ECHP as regards 
classification of educational attainment might blur our results, which become less reliable.   19
correlation between errors) are positively interrelated, conditional probabilities are always 
higher than marginal  (unconditional) effects. The countries where youths will remain for 
longer time in education are Belgium, Spain and Italy, and the transition out of education but 
not into employment (i.e. youth unemployment or economic inactivity) is more frequent in 
Italy and Greece than in the rest of the countries. We can derive this from the fact that 
marginal average probability to leave education is higher than marginal probability to start 
work. Should we estimate predicted probabilities for the four combinations of transitions we 
could see clearly this effect
20: they are the countries where youths persist more in non 
employment-education. On the contrary, the probability of start working is higher than the 
one for finishing education in Germany, Denmark and the UK, f ollowed by Ireland, Austria 
and Finland. This means that, in these countries, the probability of combining education and 
work is higher than in the rest.  
(Figure 3 about here) 
Finally, the higher distance between marginal and conditional probability of starting 
work, which refers to the increase in the probability of starting work among those who finish 
education, is highest for Austria, Denmark, Finland and Germany, followed by Ireland and the 
UK. This is an indicator of direct and successful school-to-work transitions, being the poorest 
outcomes again in Italy and Greece, followed by France and Spain.  
The estimation and plotting of marginal and conditional probabilities derived from the 
multivariate models has brought to the light the strong relation between wealth in the region 
of residence and the probability to start work but non stopping. The combination of studies 
and work has proved to be one of the best strategies to success in the labour market across 
European countries (Davia, 2003) but, unfortunately, it is an option only available to rich 
regions or countries, as we may see in Figure 3. This is not a very good news in terms of 
strategies to better insert youths in the labour market, since it gives us the idea that “good 
transitions” leading to successful careers are quite dependant on demand conditions. 
In Figure 4 it can be seen that youths living in the poorest families are the ones more 
prone to stop education but not necessarily to start work, and after a certain level of income 
(after the 25
th percentile in the overall distribution of income) the trend is clearly decreasing: 
the wealthier the family, the lower the probability to stop education, and these trends are even 
                                                 
20 The predicted probabilities for the whole array of combination of transitions (none, exiting education but 
not starting work, starting work but not exiting education and both movements) are not shown for brevity but 
they are available from the author upon request.    20
stronger when we condition the probability to stop education to the one of starting work, so 
that these results could confirm the ones mentioned in Figure 3.  
(Figure 4 about here) 
As for the probability to start working, initially, the marginal probability of start 
working does not register any relation with family income, but when it is conditioned to the 
human capital decision some interesting nuances appear: those youths leaving in very poor 
families who stop education have a strong propensity to start work, then this trend decreases 
until the 40
th percentile in the distribution of income and it goes up again, so that from a 
certain level of income, the wealthier the family, the higher the probability to start working 
conditioned to having stopped education
21. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE AGENDA 
 
In this piece of work we have confirmed that education and labour market transitions 
must be estimated in a simultaneous framework, given that they are not only determined by a 
common set of variables but also interdependent.  As for the main transition patterns across 
Europe, evidence has been found of differences between dual and sequential education 
systems, the former being more characterised by earlier transitions to employment often even 
before leaving education. The combination of s tudy and work, which provides with higher 
wage  dynamics, stability in employment and occupational upward mobility, among other 
good labour market outcomes, has turned to be quite dependent on the level of income in both 
the region of residence and the family, and very unevenly distributed across countries  with 
different institutional arrangements: the duality between countries with sequential education 
systems and those with dual schemes arise clearly in terms of school-to-work transitions.  
As for the first transition studied here, the end of  investments o n education, the more 
qualified youths are the more persistent in  the achievement of the next education level and 
vocational training programmes do provide for a quicker transition to employment in all 
levels of education and countries. Besides, l abour market conditions do not seem to determine 
the transition out of education. This result challenges some of the hypotheses drawn from our 
                                                 
21 Should the graph be plotted using family equivalent (according to the OECD scale) income relative to 
average regional income per capita, the trends would not vary but slopes would be less pronounced. The graph is 
not shown for the sake of brevity but it is available from the author upon request.    21
human capital frame: although hypotheses around family income, level and type of education 
are confirmed, the ones on income and employment expectations are not. How could we 
interpret these puzzling results?  
Even in times of economic growth the demand for youth labour has not been enough 
to provide jobs for most school-leavers, particularly in those occupations that require higher 
education degrees. This has pushed young graduates towards less demanding (and less 
rewarding) jobs and has ended in a crowding-out or expelling of the least qualified youths 
from the labour market. Should this define the real dynamics in youth labour markets, youths 
would go on in education for longer and longer and acquire qualifications above the level 
required to access the available jobs in the market in order to achieve any of them. Their 
demand for education would no more follow a strict human capital model, and would not 
adjust itself to signals from the labour market. The demand for education will probably be 
defined by the availability of the financial resources to “acquire” as much education as 
possible, and by other factors such as social (or cultural) background, proximity to 
educational institutions and the design of education systems. Therefore, in a context of 
shortage in demand for qualified youth labour, human capital theory and, particularly, the 
decision rule defining optimal investment in education is questioned. Competition for 
available posts will make overinvestment on education pay and youths and their families will 
disregard direct monetary returns to education, with non-monetary benefits and the 
consumption nature of education acquiring more relevance. Both aspects are quite difficult to 
measure. 
Nevertheless, before confirming the assertions in the paragraph above, two  other 
possibilities should be explored in the near future: our labour market indicators refer to 
nation-wide labour markets, whereas youths do not usually look at such large market. Prior 
pieces of evidence finding a strong connection  between labour market prospects and 
educational decisions gathered information on local labour markets. Unfortunately the ECHP 
has no information on local  labour markets but maybe at least large regional units might 
provide with some more precise information. Moreover, some authors have found a certain 
lag between the economic cycle and the reaction of youths (Albert, 2000), so that l agged 
variables should be also tested.  
The analysis developed here for educational decisions lack t hree very important 
variables related to institutional features: the expected direct cost of education (i.e., fees), the 
relative difficulties to access t he next levels of the education system (entry-exams or some   22
other way of limiting access to any level of education) and some indicator on who (and how) 
takes the decision to proceed to the next levels in the education system. The latter would refer 
to the  fact that, in some countries, teachers, and not parents, are the ones who take the 
decision to lead youths to each education track according to their academic performance and, 
sometimes, family background.   
As regards the observed transitions towards employment, given that our target group 
are students, most of which with a strong  inertia  to remain in education, we have hardly 
observed the expected link between level of education attained and labour market outcomes, 
but the rest of the variables enhancing  access to jobs (institutions and demand-side features) 
are confirmed.  
As for the future agenda, apart from the points already mentioned, the array of 
transitions considered in this paper can be completed with a more realistic option: labour 
supply decisions may not only be observed through transitions into employment, but also into 
unemployment. Therefore in the near future the analysis will be developed for the 
combination of three, instead of two, relevant transitions: starting work, starting looking for a 
job and leaving education. It would be very interesting to explore the possibility of going 
beyond the stationary analysis developed here without sacrificing the main advantage of the 
empirical strategy used in this paper (interdependence of decisions). Finally, we are also quite 
concerned about the need to take  “unobserved heterogeneity” into account and to properly 
study the effect of differences across educational institutions as well as going beyond the 
stationary analysis. All of the above-mentioned possibilities imply restrictions but, at the same 
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Figure 1: Situation in wave 2 or first interview
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Source: ECHP 1994-2000, Eurostat.  
Figure 2: Non-working students: main transitions observed from 
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Source: ECHP 1994-2000, Eurostat. Source: ECHP 1994-2000, Eurostat.    26
 
Table 1.Variables used in the multivariate 
regressions 
Whole 






secondary General  Vocat. 
Stop education  0,12  0,09  0,13  0,18  0,09  0,20 
Start work  0,18  0,16  0,18  0,23  0,15  0,26 
Women  0,53  0,53  0,53  0,48  0,52  0,54 
Age  20,47  21,92  19,25  19,04  20,18  21,40 
University long cycle  0,13  0,29      0,18   
University short cycle  0,23  0,49      0,30   
Higher non university  0,09  0,20        0,39 
High vocational  0,01  0,02        0,05 
General 2ndary 2nd cycle  0,32    0,81    0,42   
Vocational training centre  0,05    0,12      0,20 
Vocational training dual system  0,01    0,03      0,05 
Vocational training other  0,01    0,04      0,06 
General less than 2
nd cycle 2ndary  0,08      0,57  0,10   
Vocational training less than 2
nd cycle 2ndary  0,04      0,32    0,19 
Other vocational training  0,02      0,12    0,07 
HH pc income relative to average GDP/PPP in region  1,64  1,73  1,61  1,42  1,68  1,51 
Received some fellowship last year  0,10  0,15  0,06  0,07  0,11  0,09 
Enrolment rate for her age and country  47,69  35,45  55,69  66,08  48,68  44,49 
Recent increase in expenditure on education  6,27  6,88  5,97  5,09  5,79  7,83 
Wage premium if goes on studying  1,40  1,24  1,51  1,58  1,42  1,31 
Unemployment rate for her age and country  25,70  24,76  27,07  24,97  25,51  26,31 
GDP/PPP pc in region (logs)  9,67  9,67  9,66  9,69  9,67  9,65 
Yearly expected income if non-experienced 
unemployed /region pc income  0,07  0,05  0,07  0,09  0,06  0,07 
Head of the household: Higher education  0,19  0,22  0,17  0,13  0,20  0,15 
Head of the household: Upper secondary  0,27  0,26  0,28  0,25  0,27  0,25 
Head of the household: Lower secondary  0,45  0,39  0,49  0,53  0,44  0,47 
Lives independently from parental family  0,14  0,18  0,11  0,13  0,12  0,21 
Non-wage personal income (logs)  1,25  1,75  0,55  1,56  1,06  1,85 
Employment rate for her age and country  35,73  42,72  29,43  30,16  34,62  39,34 
Youth received private transfers  0,10  0,14  0,06  0,07  0,10  0,09 
Former working experience  0,20  0,20  0,20  0,23  0,17  0,30 
ALMP on youth as a % of GDP  0,16  0,17  0,15  0,15  0,16  0,13 
Strictness employment protection legislation  2,85  2,94  2,83  2,62  2,86  2,85 
Temporary rate for her age and country  36,24  33,94  36,71  42,58  35,74  37,84 
% of professionals in youth employment  2,96  2,84  2,91  3,47  2,82  3,41 
Germany  0,04  0,02  0,04  0,08  0,03  0,05 
Denmark  0,02  0,02  0,03  0,01  0,02  0,03 
Netherlands  0,04  0,03  0,02  0,09  0,03  0,05 
Belgium  0,05  0,04  0,06  0,07  0,05  0,06 
France  0,13  0,17  0,05  0,20  0,12  0,14 
UK  0,03  0,01  0,04  0,09  0,03  0,02 
Ireland  0,06  0,06  0,07  0,04  0,06  0,06 
Italy  0,19  0,21  0,22  0,03  0,22  0,08 
Greece  0,07  0,10  0,06  0,02  0,05  0,15 
Spain  0,20  0,18  0,20  0,25  0,18  0,27 
Portugal  0,09  0,07  0,11  0,08  0,10  0,04 
Austria  0,05  0,05  0,08  0,01  0,06  0,02 
Finland  0,03  0,03  0,03  0,04  0,03  0,03 
N  34533  16114  13602  4817  26384  8149 
Source: ECHP waves 2 to 7, Eurostat. GDP/PPP pc for regions has been drawn from REGIO data-set. 
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T.2. Biprobits: stop studying and start working, overall specification and different programmes 














Women  -0.156***  0.004  -0.135***  0.001  -0.180***  -0.037 
Age  0.089***  0.046***  0.114***  0.071***  0.056***  0.017 
University long programmes  -1.557***  -0.686***  -0.879***  -0.538***     
University short programmes  -1.713***  -0.856***  -1.086***  -0.691***     
Higher non university  -1.418***  -0.592***      -1.322***  -0.651*** 
High vocational  -0.746***  -0.149      -0.646***  -0.144 
General 2nd 2nd cycle  -1.166***  -0.530***  -0.391***  -0.302***     
Vocational training centre  -0.925***  -0.175**      -0.832***  -0.156* 
Vocational training dual system  -0.669***  -0.113      -0.662***  -0.006 
Vocational training other  -0.764***  -0.309***      -0.672***  -0.208* 
General less than 2
nd cycle 2ndary  -0.857***  -0.216**  ref  ref     
Vocational training first stage (centre)  -0.750***  -0.215***      -0.673***  -0.225** 
Vocational training first stage (other)  ref  ref      ref  ref 
HH pc income relative to average GDP/PPP 
in region  -0.081***    -0.063***    -0.096***   
received some fellowship last year  -0.102*    0.05    -0.477***   
enrolment rate for her age and country  -0.005***    -0.005***    -0.006***   
recent increase in expenditure on education 0.005    0    0.012***   
wage premium if goes on studying  -0.012    0.015    -0.047   
unemployment rate for her age and country 0.007**    0.008***    0.004   
GDP/PPP pc in region (logs)  -0.416***  0.225**  -0.401***  0.196  -0.468***  0.212* 
yearly expected income if unemployed 
/region pc inc  0.504    -0.702    1.842**   
HOH: higher education  -0.023    -0.069    0.006   
HOH: upper secondary  0.101    0.014    0.193**   
HOH: lower secondary  0.258***    0.227***    0.201**   
Lives independently from parental family  -0.083**         
Non-wage personal income logs    -0.012***    -0.012***    -0.01 
Employment rate for her age and country  0.009***    0.007***    0.008*** 
Youth received private transfers    0.081    0.085    -0.056 
Former working experience    0.228***    0.268***    0.195*** 
ALMP on youth as a % of GDP    2.253***    2.614***    2.274** 
Strictness employment protection legislation  -0.149**    -0.165**    -0.132 
Temporary rate for her age and country    0.003**    0.003*    0.003 
% of professionals in youth employment  0.118***    0.128***    0.109*** 
Germany  0.107  0.431***  0.02  0.531***  0.053  0.408** 
Denmark  0.101  0.207  0.821*  0.213  -0.794*  0.277 
Netherlands  0.979***  -0.283**  1.253***  -0.151  0.606***  -0.397** 
Belgium  0.142*  0.197**  0.134  0.255**  0.14  0.290** 
France  0.568***  -0.139  0.596***  -0.181  0.502***  -0.067 
UK  0.292  -0.610**  0.602  -0.546  0.126  -0.909*** 
Ireland  0.372**  -0.074  0.802***  0.041  -0.078  -0.34 
Italy  0.579***  0.024  0.645***  0.006  0.516***  0.192 
Greece  0.686***  -0.044  0.775***  -0.07  0.517***  -0.032 
Portugal  0.516***  0.18  0.619***  0.193  0.052  0.151 
Austria  0.352***  0.422***  0.438***  0.493***  0.119  0.658*** 
Finland  0.23  -0.13  0.458*  -0.146  -0.044  -0.178 
Constant  1.745*  -4.368***  0.249  -4.803***  3.105**  -3.583*** 
             
Observations  34533  34533  27205  27205  8406  8406 
rho (pvalue rho)  -0,351  (0.000)  -0,394  (0.000)  -0,287  (0.000) 
W test: rho = 0 (Prob > W)  217.83  (0.000)  205.8  (0.000)  105.8  (0.000) 
Wald Chi2 (Prob > chi2)  7380.7  (0.000)  4935.8  (0.000)  2536.36  (0.000) 
Note: Robust z statistics estimated; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Reference: Spanish man with neither fellowship nor private transfers, living with his parents, who have primary education 
only. Dummies for year of first interview have been omitted 
Source: ECHP, waves 2 to 7, Eurostat.   28
 
T.3. Biprobits: stop studying and start working, differentiating among education levels  
 



















Women  -0.072  0.032  -0.251***  0.091**  -0.190*  -0.202** 
Age  0.090***  0.086***  0.110***  0.025  0.066***  0.02 
University long cycle  -0.879***  -0.510***         
University short cycle  -0.940***  -0.667***         
Higher non university  -0.720***  -0.421***         
High vocational  ref  ref         
General secondary 2nd cycle      -0.311**  -0.339***     
Vocational training centre      -0.108  0.071     
Vocational training dual system      0.23  0.108     
Vocational training other      ref  ref     
less than second stage secondary          -0.662***  -0.192 
vocational training first stage (centre)          -0.631***  -0.142 
vocational training first stage (other)          ref  ref 
HHpc income relative to average regional GDP/PP -0.055**    -0.082***    -0.167***   
Received some fellowship last year  -0.046    -0.335**    -0.151   
Enrolment rate for her age and country  -0.005***    -0.004***    -0.009***   
Recent increase in expenditure on education  -0.001    0.010*    0   
Wage premium if goes on studying  -0.186*    -0.071    0.116   
Unemployment rate for her age and country  0.005    0.005    0.010*   
PPP pc in region logs  -0.428***  0.213**  -0.396***  0.402***  -0.316*  -0.128 
Yearly expected income if (non-exper) 
unemployed   -0.611    3.026**    -0.629   
HOH: higher education attainment  0.052    -0.022    -0.055   
HOH: upper secondary attainment  0.173**    0.13    0.154   
HOH: lower secondary attainment  0.264***    0.397***    0.23   
Lives independently from parental family  0.000    -0.174***    -0.275*** 
Non-wage personal income logs    -0.001    -0.014**    -0.028*** 
Employment rate for her age and country  0.006***    0.014***    0.011*** 
Youth received private transfers    -0.028    0.148    0.059 
Former working experience    0.287***    0.300***    0.139 
ALMP on youth as a % of GDP    2.001***    1.233    3.058* 
Strictness employment protection legislation  -0.133    -0.017    -0.237 
Temporary rate for her age and country    0.002    0.004    0.001 
% of professionals in youth employment  0.131***    0.101*    0.079 
Germany  0.02  0.025  -0.258  0.311  0.337  0.769*** 
Denmark  0.896  0.12  -1.328*  0.255  0.205  -0.012 
Netherlands  1.453***  -0.085  0.695***  -0.482**  0.676**  -0.518** 
Belgium  0.236  0.301**  0.242**  0.382**  -0.322  -0.555** 
France  0.715***  -0.005  0.516***  0.115  0.211  -0.482 
UK  1.410***  -0.333  -1.154  -0.218  0.71  -0.882* 
Ireland  0.269  0.12  -0.279  0.558  0.749*  -1.494*** 
Italy  0.558***  -0.04  0.772***  0.184  0.212  -0.142 
Greece  0.926***  -0.089  0.688***  0.069  0.355**  -0.183 
Portugal  0.695***  0.291  0.592***  0.317  0.085  -0.208 
Austria  -0.188  0.14  0.586***  0.462**  0.659  0.967** 
Finland  0.42  -0.048  0.015  0.084  -0.164  -0.626* 
Constant  1.268  -5.179***  0.251  -6.458***  1.32  0.092 
             
Observations  16114  16114  13602  13602  4817  4817 
rho (pvalue rho)  -0,453  (0.000)  -0,300  (0.000)  -0,214  (0.000) 
W test: rho = 0 (Prob > W)  202.3  (0.000)  133.537  (0.000)  28.91  (0.000) 
Wald Chi2 (Prob > chi2)  4377.5  (0.000)  4527.64  (0.000)  2194.1  (0.000) 
Note: Robust z statistics estimated ; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reference: Spanish man 
with neither fellowship nor private transfers, living with his parents, who have primary education only. Dummies for year of first 
interview have been omitted. Source: ECHP, waves 1 to 7, Eurostat 



















Source: ECHP (waves 2 to 7), Eurostat. 
 















cond p (stop edu)
cond p (start work)
 
     Source: ECHP (waves 2 to 7), Eurostat 
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